Challenger launch11/25/2023 ![]() ![]() The organizational culture, however, remained the same. In the aftermath of the Challenger explosion, Vaughan says NASA made substantial changes to procedures, decision-making processes, and the technology used. “My investigation found that they didn’t actively argue for a launch they knew was risky, but they were surprised as everyone else because they thought it was safe to fly,” Vaughan says. The O-Rings had worked then, and NASA managers assumed they would work again. Years' worth of recorded proof indicated the O-Rings had repeatedly showed flaws that were subsequently fixed, including the previous year when the O-Rings eroded after a cold-weather launch in January 1985. But given that the O-Rings had always been considered a problem, NASA wasn’t alarmed. NASA’s paper trail showed that the night before the launch, the engineers’ concerns about the cold weather’s effect on the O-Rings were noted and considered. In her book, Vaughan wrote that “.the cause of the disaster was embedded in the banality of organizational life.” “They developed a cultural belief: If they did everything possible, followed all the rules, it would be safe to fly,” Vaughan says.īoth internal and external reviews and years of documentation played into this culture of confidence. NASA managers had deemed the O-Rings an “acceptable risk.” Every prescribed procedure was followed and every box checked. In the moment, however, the organization didn’t feel as though the system was failing. “That continued until accepting the failure was normal and routine for them,” Vaughan says. New problems arose and those were fixed as well. For NASA, the concerns with the O-Rings began in the late 1970s. Normalization of deviance, Vaughan says, is an organizational phenomenon. The groupthink theory dominated until 1996, when sociologist Diane Vaughan published The Challenger Launch Decision and introduced the concept of “normalization of deviance,” a behavior, she warned, that could crop up within any organization. And NASA employees were also overconfident - they had never experienced an in-flight death before. For example, the engineers who warned against the O-Ring cold-weather defect were hired from an outside firm and subject to outsider stereotypes. Social scientists applied Janis’ eight symptoms to the Challenger launch and found significant similarities. Janis described eight symptoms of groupthink, including overconfidence, collective rationalization, self-censorship, and the tendency to stereotype perceived outsiders. This motivates members to prioritize harmony whenever faced with a problem or challenge. He wrote that cohesive groups develop a mode of thinking in order to maintain agreement and limit friction. Yale University social psychologist Irving Janis introduced this theory in the 1970s. Social scientists initially cited the concept of groupthink as to why NASA scientists thought the Challenger’s O-Rings were safe to fly in cold weather. The next question -which was harder to answer: how such a catastrophe could occur in absence of any clear wrongdoing. Government inquiries confirmed that the decision to move ahead with the questionable O-Rings technically followed NASA protocol. The O-Rings failed, hot gases escaped the rocket booster and an explosion ensued. The launch was delayed for two hours to allow ice to melt off the launch pad, but it wasn’t enough to prevent disaster. The night before the big event, engineers warned the temperatures might be too cold for the O-Rings and weaken their seal. The morning of the launch was unusually cold for Florida - just 36 degrees Fahrenheit at the time of the launch. ![]() These boosters’ joints had been sealed by rubber O-Rings, which were designed to seal the gap and prevent hot gases from leaking. During liftoff, two rocket boosters were meant to provide the space shuttle with the necessary thrust. The government quickly launched an investigation into why the Challenger exploded. The country later learned that the seven astronauts aboard died. The camera panned down as streams of smoke plummeted toward the ocean. “Flight controller is looking very closely at the situation,” Nesbitt stated calmly. Suddenly, the camera went blurry and the screen filled with white smoke and flashing flames.Īfter a pause, the correspondent suggested the rocket boosters used during the launch had blown away from the spacecraft. Nesbit continued to update the positioning. The Challenger arched in the sky, and the blazing back end of the engines filled the screen. Viewers listened to the roar of the engines while Nesbitt described them as operating as expected. A bit of static brought in Nesbitt’s voice as he noted the Challenger properly rolled, a technique used to reduce stress on the wings. ![]()
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